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Abstract
This paper uses a multinomial logit model to examine the factors associated with the
occurrence of both self-fulfilling and fundamental banking crises. We find evidence
indicating that the two types of crises are indeed different, and are explained by different
variables. Self-fulfilling crises tend to occur when bank liabilities relative to reserves are
high, when the financial system is liberalized, and for high levels of short-term debt relative
to total debt. They are also associated with lending booms and government surpluses. In
contrast, fundamental crises are linked to depreciations of the local currency, to financial
liberalization and are negatively related to the country's level of development and quality of
institutions. Also, countries that experienced multiple crises are more likely to experience
fundamental crises.
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There are two main theoretical views for the causes of banking crises. The fundamental
banking crises view is that they are the consequence of poor economic performance (see
Chari and Jagannathan 1988, Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988, and Allen and Gale 1998).
The self-ful￿lling view is that bank runs are the result of multiple equilibria, where a panic is
the realization of a bad equilibrium caused by self-ful￿lling expectations (see Diamond and
Dybvig 1983, Freeman 1988 and Peck and Shell 2003).
The goal of this paper is to investigate the factors that may be associated with self-
ful￿lling and fundamental banking crises. Fontenla (2006) ￿nds that policy implications
may be di⁄erent depending on the type of crises an economy faces. Thus, identifying the
particular characteristics to each type of crisis becomes critical. If banking crises are due to
fundamentals, then macroeconomic stabilization policies should be crucial to prevent such
occurrences. On the other hand, if a crisis is due to multiple equilibria, then policies
conductive to eliminate indeterminacies and volatility may be the adequate government
measure.
Previous empirical work that addresses the divergence in the theoretical literature has
been mixed. Gorton (1988) ￿nds that during 1863-1914 panics were caused by fundamentals.
Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) con￿rm Gorton￿ s ￿ndings for a sample of countries
for the 1980-94 period. In contrast, Boyd, Gomis, Kwack and Smith (2001) ￿nd that banking
crises may often be the outcome of bad realizations of sunspot equilibria.
In this paper, we construct an index that di⁄erentiates between the two types of crises.
This allows us to use a multinomial logit model, instead of the previously used binomial
logit, to investigate the determinants of self-ful￿lling and fundamental banking crises. We
￿nd evidence indicating that the two types of crises are indeed di⁄erent, and are explained
by di⁄erent variables. In particular, we ￿nd that self-ful￿lling crises tend to occur when
bank liabilities relative to reserves are high, for periods of rapid domestic credit growth and
when the ￿nancial system is liberalized. In addition, self-ful￿lling crises are associated with
government surpluses and high levels of short-term debt relative to total debt. In contrast,
fundamental crises are linked to depreciations of the local currency, to ￿nancial liberalization
and to the country￿ s GNP per capita. Also, countries that experienced multiple crises are
more likely to experience fundamental crises. Finally, by accounting for the possibility of
self-ful￿lling crises, our results provide better support to existing self-ful￿lling theoretical
models. In particular, our results agree with the self-ful￿lling theoretic models mentioned
above, and more generally to ￿nancial crises models such as Calvo and Mendoza (1996), and
1Cole and Kehoe (2001).
2. Identifying types of Crises
In order to categorize banking crises as fundamental or self-fulling we construct a banking
crisis index, following similar work by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999). Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) create an index of exchange
rate speculative pressure by creating a weighted average of exchange rate changes, reserves
and interest rate changes. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) create a similar index based on
exchange rate and reserve changes.
We identify a fundamental crisis when macroeconomic fundamentals are adverse, such as
negative or weak GDP growth, excessively high real interest rates and high in￿ ation. On the
other hand, when GDP growth is high, and interest rates and in￿ ation are low, we label it
a self-ful￿lling crisis. The banking crises index (It) is constructed by calculating a weighted
average of lagged real GDP growth, real interest rates (ri) and in￿ ation (￿) for the systemic
crises identi￿ed by Caprio et al (2005). The three components of the index are weighted by
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When this index falls below a threshold (If), we identify it as a fundamental crisis and





0 if no banking crisis occurred
1 if It < If fundamental banking crisis
2 if It ￿ If self-ful￿lling banking crisis
(2)
For our dataset we set If = 0:8 which corresponds to GDP growth around 4%, values
of real interest rates around 10% and in￿ ation rates of 7%. Given the ad-hoc nature of
this threshold, we conduct sensitivity analysis to see how lowering or raising this threshold
matters. We ￿nd the conclusions to be robust. We do not report them here due to space
limitations.
23. Estimation and Explanatory Variables
In order to investigate self-ful￿lling and fundamental banking crises we regress our type
of banking crises dummy C against a set of explanatory variables chosen to re￿ ect both
theory and previous empirical work. We lag all variables by one period in order to rule out
reverse causality. The following are the explanatory variables used in our analysis:
Ratio of M2 to foreign reserves (RM2): this variable is intended to measure vulnerabil-
ity to capital out￿ ows. M2 may be thought as a proxy for liabilities of the banking system.
When M2 exceeds foreign reserves, a negative money demand shock, perhaps self-ful￿lling,
may render ￿xed exchange rates implausible (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996).
Depreciation rate relative to the US dollar (DP): this intends to capture the extent
to which sharp depreciations may cause crises in countries over exposed to foreign exchange
risk.
Domestic credit growth (DMC): this is used to account for the view that bank lending
booms may precede crises.
Government surplus to GDP (GS): this variables signals the ability of governments to
repay their debts.
Ratio of short-term debt to total debt (ST): high levels may generate fear of default,
which becomes self-ful￿lling.
GNP per capita (GNPP): this is considered as a proxy for the development of the ￿nancial
system and quality of institutions, as these variables are thought to be positively correlated
with GNP per capita.
Financial liberalization dummy (FL): previous empirical work ￿nds that ￿nancial lib-
eralization signi￿cantly increases the probability of banking crises. In general, higher capital
￿ ows may increase volatility and allow for foreign exchange risk.
Multiple crises country dummy (MC): according to Boyd et. al. (2001) the determi-
nants of a crisis is di⁄erent in countries that have experienced only one crisis in the last 25
years versus those that have had repeated crises.
Fixed (FE) and ￿ oating exchange (FLE) rate dummy: ￿xed exchange rates have
often been linked to banking crises, because they may induce banks to excessively borrow
abroad. Floating exchange rates, on the other hand, may be viewed as generating exchange
risk and adding another layer of uncertainty to banks (see Eichengreen and Arteta 2002).
Northern interest (NI) rate and OECD growth (OEG): these two variables are
included to account for real external e⁄ects, since changes in capital ￿ ows may respond to
changes in world interest rates and output growth.
3Changes in terms of trade (TT): this variable accounts for external shocks in trade that
may cause ￿nancial distress.
The baseline model for the multinomial logit considers the ￿rst seven explanatory vari-
ables as follows:
Ct = ￿ + ￿1DPt￿1 + ￿2RM2t￿1+￿3DCGt￿1 + ￿4GSt￿1 + ￿5STt￿1
+￿6GNPPt￿1 + ￿1FL
(3)
We consider ￿ve possible speci￿cations. The ￿rst one is given by the baseline model of
equation (3). The second speci￿cation includes the dummy for countries that experienced
multiple crises. The third model includes two dummy variables for ￿ oating and ￿xed ex-
change rate regimes. In the fourth model we add the terms of trade to test for external
factors that may cause banking crises. The last speci￿cation includes both northern interest
rates and OECD growth rates.
4. Banking Crises Data
The data covers the period 1974-1997 for 51 developing countries, which includes the
important Latin American and Asian crises of the late 90￿ s. Following previous literature,
we exclude centrally planned economies and high income OECD countries. The identi￿cation
and dating of banking crises is taken from Caprio et al (2005). There are 84 systemic banking
crises in our period. Since crises often last several years, we consider only the ￿rst observation
for each systemic banking crisis, in order to prevent reverse causality. The data sources for
the index and explanatory variables are primarily obtained from the International Financial
Statistics (IMF), and the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
5. Results
In order to compare the multinomial approach to previous work we start by obtaining
the results for a binomial logit. The binomial logit uses the same explanatory variables as
in equation (3) but the dependent variable is changed to show whether there is a banking
crises or not regardless of the type. Table 1 presents the solution for the baseline model
and the other four speci￿cations. The ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves, ￿nancial
liberalization and domestic credit growth are signi￿cant across all speci￿cations. These
results con￿rm previous work by Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Eichengreen
and Arteta (2002).
4The next step is to divide crises into self-ful￿lling and fundamental according to our index
and solve the multinomial logit regressions. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the ￿ve
regressions outlined in the previous section. We reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of
the independent variables are jointly equal to zero at the 1 percent level in all regressions.
Furthermore, in the baseline regression the hypothesis that self-ful￿lling and fundamental
crises are equal is rejected at the 1% signi￿cance level. For the other four speci￿cations
we reject that self-ful￿lling and fundamental crises are equal at least the 5% level. These
results suggests that all banking crises are not alike, and perhaps both self-ful￿lling and
fundamental theories are correct.
In all multinomial logit regressions, the coe¢ cient for the rate of currency depreciation
is negative (appreciation) but not signi￿cant for self-ful￿lling crises. In contrast, the rate of
depreciation is positively associated with a higher probability of fundamental crises. The
coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 5% level for all speci￿cations. Notice that for the binomial
logit regressions in Table 1, depreciation shows no signi￿cant e⁄ect for most regressions.
The ratio of M2 to gross international reserves is positive and highly signi￿cant for all
self-ful￿lling crises, but loses signi￿cance for fundamental crises. While the signi￿cance of
this variable is also picked up in the binomial regressions, the results given by accounting
for both types of crises provides stronger support to self-ful￿lling theoretical models such as
Calvo and Mendoza (1996). The rate of domestic credit growth tells a similar story, it is
positively associated with self-ful￿lling banking crises while it shows no e⁄ect for fundamental
crises. This supports the idea that lending booms may have played an important role in self-
ful￿lling events. The ￿nancial liberalization dummy is strongly signi￿cant in the binomial
logit speci￿cation, and continues to be signi￿cant across both types of crises when we run
multinomial logit regressions. This suggests that ￿nancial liberalization may be conducive
to the existence of indeterminacies and excess volatility, and may also have direct e⁄ects on
bank￿ s balance sheets through increased competition and risk taking. Government budget
surplus as a percent of GDP is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% con￿dence level for all
self-ful￿lling crises, except when the multiple crises dummy is introduced. For fundamental
crises the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant. This result sheds light over previous empirical work
that is not able to explain that budget surpluses, rather than de￿cits, are associated with
banking crises. Our interpretation is that budget surpluses support the notion that it is not
fundamentals that are causing these group of crises.
Short term debt to total debt is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level for all self-ful￿lling
crises, and negative and insigni￿cant for fundamental crises. This result provides strong
5support for Cole and Kehoe (2001) theoretical model of self-ful￿lling debt crises. We ￿nd
support for the belief that less developed countries, or countries with weaker institutions, are
more prone to fundamental crises, as proxied by GNP per capita. This variable is negative
and signi￿cant at the 10% level for fundamental crises except when terms of trade changes
are introduced, and shows no e⁄ect for self-ful￿lling crises. When we introduce the multiple
crises dummy, we ￿nd support for the idea that countries that experienced multiple banking
crises are more vulnerable to fundamental crises.
6. Conclusions
This paper follows a multinomial logit approach to di⁄erentiate between fundamental
and self-ful￿lling crises. We ￿nd strong evidence indicating that the two types of crises
are indeed di⁄erent, and are explained by di⁄erent variables. Self-ful￿lling crises tend to
occur when M2 relative to reserves is high, for periods of rapid domestic credit growth
and when the ￿nancial system is liberalized. In addition, self-ful￿lling crises are associated
with government surpluses and high levels of short-term debt relative to total debt, results
that are not present in the binomial logit model. In contrast, fundamental crises are linked
to depreciations of the local currency, to ￿nancial liberalization and to the country￿ s level
of development as proxied by GNP per capita. Furthermore, countries that experienced
multiple crises are more likely to experience fundamental crises. These results agree with
theoretical models such as Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), and
Cole and Kehoe (2001).
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7Table 1: Banking Crises: Binomial Logit Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DP 0.17693 0.1168806 0.1816134 0.1570966 0.1705798
(0.104) (0.266) (0.098) (0.144) (0.106)
RM2 0.0436406 0.0382265 0.0428331 0.0457394 0.0537812
(0.052) (0.095) (0.056) (0.044) (0.018)
DMC 0.0058132 0.0051465 0.0058602 0.0055762 0.0057089
(0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
FL 1.716014 1.703842 1.723896 1.634726 1.881389
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
GS 0.0509828 0.0222437 0.0504099 0.0287788 0.0703162
(0.254) (0.613) (0.257) (0.570) (0.119)
ST 0.029232 0.0310086 0.0298204 0.0323952 0.0226192
(0.102) (0.082) (0.098) (0.080) (0.239)
GNPP - 0.000059 -0.0000674 - 0.0000696 -0.00005 -0.0000498
(0.593) (0.535) (0.544) (0.652) (0.672)
MC ￿ 0.9189972 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (0.031) ￿ ￿ ￿
FE ￿ ￿ -0.0540256 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ (0.912) ￿ ￿
FLE ￿ ￿ -0.1686768 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ (0.747) ￿ ￿
TT ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.8404238 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (0.616) ￿
NI ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.0099069
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (0.020)
OEG ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -18.96226
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (0.238)
Obs. 657 657 653 621 657
LR ￿2 42.25 46.68 42.12 40.15 49.88
Prob > ￿2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1614 0.1784 0.1612 0.1593 0.1906
P-values in parenthesis; DP=depreciation; RM2= M2/foreign reserves; DMC=domestic credit
growth; FL=￿nancial liberalization; GS=govt.surplus/GDP; ST=short-term debt/total debt;
GNPP=GNP per capita; MC=multicrisis; FE=￿xed ex. rate; FLE= ￿ oating ex. rate
TT= change terms trade; NI=north interest rate;OEG=north GDP growth
8Table 2: Banking Crises Models 1-3: Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Self-Ful￿lling Fundamental Self-Ful￿lling Fundamental Self-Ful￿lling Fundamental
DP - 1.073958 0.4830678 -1.120047 0.394626 -1.146996 0.5136561
(0.330) (0.013) (0.299) (0.034) (0.282) (0.011)
RM2 0.092669 0.0122651 0.0919657 0.0077248 0.0977948 0.0109191
(0.003) (0.747) (0.003) (0.840) (0.003) (0.771)
DCG 0.0096085 0.0017656 0.0088151 0.0014686 0.009587 0.0017695
(0.014) (0.628) (0.031) (0.700) (0.019) (0.625)
FL 1.678321 1.416992 1.549311 1.359341 1.467096 1.624925
(0.053) (0.034) (0.077) (0.044) (0.091) (0.021)
GS 0.2319527 -0.0135162 0.1841148 -0.0356503 0.268821 -0.0129637
(0.037) (0.800) (0.111) (0.470) (0.026) (0.818)
ST 0.0557317 -0.0276998 0.0567809 -0.0306277 0.0611751 -0.0212404
(0.034) (0.501) (0.028) (0.472) (0.030) (0.589)
GNPP 0.0000587 -0.0006295 0.0000812 -0.0006379 0.0000911 -0.0006398
(0.673) (0.088) (0.559) (0.077) (0.570) (0.087)
MC ￿ ￿ 0.6748266 1.159765 ￿ ￿
(0.355) (0.096)
FE ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.0245935 0.5116356
(0.978) (0.578)
FLE ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.9928716 -0.1590694
(0.270) (0.873)
Obs. 650 650 646
LR ￿2 60.26 63.56 62.64
Prob > ￿2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2369 0.25 0.2466
Test Self-Ful￿lling=Fundamentals
￿2 18.79 18.82 19.72
Prob > ￿2 0.0089 0.0158 0.0197
P-values in parenthesis; DP=depreciation; RM2= M2/foreign reserves; DMC=domestic credit
growth; FL=￿nancial liberalization; GS=govt.surplus/GDP; ST=short-term debt/total debt;
GNPP=GNP per capita; MC=multicrisis; FE=￿xed ex. rate; FLE= ￿ oating ex. rate
9Table 3: Banking Crises Models 4-5: Multinomial Logit
(4) (5)
Variables Self-Ful￿lling Fundamental Self-Ful￿lling Fundamental
DP - 1.111658 0.4448102 -1.1474718 0.487923
(0.330) (0.020) (0.308) (0.013)
RM2 0.0906095 0.017889 0.1008191 0.0135123
(0.003) (0.640) (0.002) (0.725)
DMC 0.009806 0.0015683 0.0095749 0.0016632
(0.013) (0.669) (0.014) (0.658)
FL 1.615514 1.438828 1.848188 1.42472
(0.062) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038)
GS 0.2258436 -0.0286585 0.2458352 -0.0088075
(0.045) (0.625) (0.025) (0.867)
ST 0.0567259 -0.0272917 0.0491883 -0.0283277
(0.035) (0.508) (0.072) (0.502)
GNPP 0.0000526 -0.0005785 0.0000792 -0.0006336
(0.707) (0.110) (0.587) (0.091)
TT -0.6571291 -0.9176985 ￿ ￿
(0.836) (0.715)
NI ￿ ￿ 0.0080832 0.0022815
(0.222) (0.772)
OEG ￿ ￿ -10.48022 -14.27874
(0.709) (0.545)
Observation 615 650
LR ￿2 59.28 62.44
Prob > ￿2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2358 0.2455
Test Self-Ful￿lling=Fundamentals
￿2 18.55 19.38
Prob > ￿2 0.0175 0.0222
P-values in parenthesis; DP=depreciation; RM2= M2/foreign reserves;
DMC=dom. credit growth; FL=￿nancial liberalization;
GS=government surplus/GDP; ST=short-term debt/total debt;
GNPP=GNP per capita; TT= change terms trade;
NI=north interest rate; OEG=north GDP growth
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